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Abstract—User privacy is a requirement for wireless vehicular
communications, and a number of privacy protection strategies
have already been developed and standardized. In particular,
methods relying on the use of temporary pseudonyms and silent
periods have proved their ability to confuse attackers who would
attempt to track vehicles. In addition to their ability to protect
privacy, it is important to ensure that these privacy strategies
do not hinder the safety applications which rely on vehicular
communications. This paper addresses this concern and presents
an experimental analysis of the impact of privacy strategies
on Intersection Collision Avoidance (ICA) systems. We simulate
traffic scenarios at a road intersection and compare the ability
of a collision avoidance system to avoid collisions for different
pseudonym change schemes. The privacy level is analyzed, as
well as the influence of the duration of the silent period on the
safety performance of the ICA system. The results highlight the
need to jointly design safety applications and privacy strategies.
Index Terms—Vehicular communication networks, privacy
strategies, silent period, safety applications, collision avoidance
systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless vehicular communications (or Vehicle-to-X com-
munications, V2X) open new opportunities for safety-related
applications and Intelligent Transportation Systems. The shar-
ing of information such as road conditions and current tra-
jectories allows a vehicle to perceive its environment beyond
the field of view of its on-board sensors, leading to a better
situation awareness. Studies have shown that the potential of
V2X-based safety systems should be greater than standalone
safety systems [1], and that V2X applications may potentially
address up to 81% of crash scenarios [2]. The potential of V2X
for safety has also been demonstrated by a number of Field
Operational Tests in Europe [3], the US [4], and Japan [5].
Another aspect of V2X-based applications is the privacy and
security of information. Privacy is required in order to ensure
acceptance by users [6]. In addition, the sharing of information
between vehicles is expected to have an impact on traffic
safety, therefore this information must be secured [7]. For this
reason authentication mechanisms are mandatory for vehicular
communications, so that receivers can verify that the sender
is an authorized vehicle. However, if no privacy protection
is implemented on top of the authentication mechanism, then
any vehicle can be remotely tracked by eavesdropping on the
communication channel. Information about the authenticated
drivers could be inferred (home address, work, medical condi-
tion, etc.), jeopardizing their privacy. One solution to protect
the user while allowing authentication mechanisms is to sign
messages using temporary identifiers, namely pseudonyms.
However defining strategies for pseudonym change is not triv-
ial. A simple periodic change would be easy to circumvent [8],
therefore some more advanced pseudonym change strategies
have been proposed involving random pseudonym changes and
a “silent period” after each change.
These privacy protection schemes are not without con-
sequences for safety applications. Such applications make
decisions (e.g. warning drivers of an upcoming danger) based
on their current estimation of the state of the real world, and
this representation is created from the information contained in
beacons received from other vehicles. Therefore, interruptions
in the transmission of information will impact the decision-
making process. If a silent period is scheduled to start at
a safety-critical moment, it could result in safety systems
not intervening when they should have, namely a “missed
intervention”. From a user and safety perspective, this is not
acceptable.
In this paper we address this issue and evaluate the impact
of pseudonym change strategies on V2X-based collision avoid-
ance systems. In particular we focus on Intersection Collision
Avoidance (ICA) systems. This choice is motivated by the
considerable potential of V2X-based safety applications to
reduce the number of crashes at road intersections, compared
to standalone safety systems. Indeed, a major issue for safety
applications at road intersections is the potential occlusion of
part of the scene due to the geometry of the intersection,
the presence of obstacles like trees, buildings, etc. Some of
the other vehicles can be detected by on-board exteroceptive
sensors such as cameras, radars, or lidars, but others will be
occluded or simply be beyond the field of view of the sensors.
V2X communications do not suffer from this limitation and the
hope is that this will help reducing the number of intersection-
related accidents, which currently represent 40 to 50 percent
of road accidents in most countries [9], [10].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents related work addressing the impact of network and
security mechanisms on cooperative collision avoidance ap-
plications. Section III describes the main pseudonym change
strategies and introduces the concept of silent period. In
Section IV we describe the methodology used to conduct our
evaluation. Section V presents the results of our simulations.
Finally, Section VI draws conclusions and presents future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
Haas and Hu [11] analyzed the ability of a V2X-based
intersection collision warning application to warn drivers suf-
ficiently in advance of a potential collision that the involved
drivers can stop. Especially, they investigated the reliability
requirements of VANET communications, and evaluated the
impact of different transmission powers and authentication
mechanisms on the ability to avoid crashes. This work demon-
strates the impact of network and security mechanisms on
safety applications.
Petit and Mammeri [12] analyzed the impact of authentica-
tion mechanisms (namely ECDSA) on the braking distance
and the delay of decision in cooperative collision warning
applications. Their results highlight the significant conse-
quences of security mechanisms on the performance of safety
applications.
Our work differs from the aforementioned papers in that
we analyze the impact of privacy mechanisms on collision
avoidance systems. More specifically, we analyze the effect of
pseudonym change strategies involving silent periods on the
ability to predict and avoid collisions.
III. PSEUDONYM SCHEMES
The current set of vehicular communication standards in Eu-
rope [13]–[15] mandates the use of asymmetric cryptography
for authentication mechanisms, namely the Elliptic Curve Dig-
ital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with P-256 elliptic curve.
Unfortunately, authentication mechanisms break user privacy
as every receiver learns the identity of the sender. Therefore,
a short-term credential –pseudonym– should be implemented
in order to prevent authentication mechanisms from easing
vehicle tracking. The pseudonym has to be changed frequently
to ensure a sufficient level of privacy [16]. The ETSI TS 102
867 standard recommends changing one’s pseudonym every
five minutes [17].
In the US, the SAE J2735 standard [18] defines the Probe
Segment Number (PSN), which enables users to share trajec-
tory information for a limited amount of time or over a limited
distance. To ensure privacy, the PSN is changed by a vehicle
every 120 seconds or 1 km, whichever comes last.
However, as soon as the attacker knows the period of
pseudonym changes –which is easy to assess– tracking be-
comes trivial [8]. In order to avoid this issue brought by
fixed pseudonym change periods, vehicles can change their
pseudonym randomly [19]. As a result, an adversary cannot
forecast the next pseudonym change. However, tracking is still
possible if only one or few vehicles change pseudonyms at a
specific time and location, because all other neighbors keep
the same identity. Thus, linking the new and old pseudonym
of the vehicle that performed the change is still trivial. A
solution is to introduce a silent period (i.e., the vehicle stops
broadcasting information) after each pseudonym change [20]–
[23]. The silent period makes tracking attacks more complex.
For example, if a vehicle changes its pseudonym before
entering an intersection and then stays silent for some time, it
becomes very difficult to assess the new position of the vehicle.
In the current SAE J2735 standard [18] each new PSN comes
with a random silent period (named changeover gap) with a
duration of 50 to 250 m or 3 to 13 seconds, whichever comes
first.
To further harden tracking attacks, Gerlach and Gu¨ttler [24]
proposed a mix-context approach where vehicles change their
pseudonyms when they detect a favorable context, such as a
favorable number of neighbors, their speeds and directions.
To identify the best opportunity to change pseudonyms, a
threshold on the minimum entropy has to be defined either
by the user or by an application.
IV. METHODOLOGY
This section describes the methodology used to conduct our
analysis. We first describe the addressed scenarios and how the
simulations are run. The second part of this section introduces
the safety application considered in this analysis and describes
the collision avoidance system.
A. Simulating road intersection scenarios
1) Generating trajectories: The PreScan simulator [25]
is used to create a two-way-stop intersection layout and to
simulate trajectories for vehicles traversing it. PreScan can
generate both non-colliding and colliding pairs of trajectories,
and the user can synchronize the trajectories of two vehicles
so that they intersect at a specific location.
Four different scenarios are defined, each of them involving
an “Ego Vehicle” (EV) driving on the main road towards
the intersection and an “Other Vehicle” (OV) approaching
the intersection from a secondary road and performing
various maneuvers. The scenarios are illustrated in Fig. 1.
Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 are collision scenarios where the EV
and the OV collide after the OV violated the stop sign.
They were selected because they cover 60% of all accident
scenarios at road intersections in Europe [9]. Such accidents
are typically caused by the driver of the OV failing to notice
the presence of the stop sign, or misjudging the speed and
distance of the EV [26]. Scenario 4 is a no-collision scenario
where the OV stops at the stop line and yields to the EV.
Fig. 1. The four simulated scenarios. For each scenario the maneuver of the
“Ego Vehicle” (EV) is shown in plain green and the maneuver of the “Other
Vehicle” (OV) is shown in dotted red.
2) Simulating privacy strategies: We simulate 3 different
privacy protection strategies, described below.
The “Fixed ID” strategy assigns a fixed pseudonym to a
vehicle for the entire duration of a trip (i.e. a new pseudonym
is assigned to the vehicle every time it starts). Testing this
case will give us a reference for how well the collision
avoidance system performs when there is no pseudonym
change and no silent period during a trip.
The “Baseline” strategy follows the recommendations of the
SAE J2735 standard [18]. Pseudonyms are changed every
Tchg = 120 seconds and are followed by a silent period of
random duration Tsil comprised between 0 and 13 seconds.
Even if silent periods of duration shorter than 3 seconds are
not considered in [18], we include them in our tests in order
to analyze the impact of the silent period duration on the
safety system.
The “Adaptive” strategy is a modified version of the Baseline
strategy where the risk of the situation is taken into account to
decide whether or not vehicle i should be allowed to change
pseudonym at time t. It relies on the computation of the
probability P (safety guaranteedi,t), where the binary variable
safety guaranteedi,t ∈ {0, 1} corresponds to the current
ability of the collision avoidance system to keep vehicle i on
a collision-free trajectory. A pseudonym change at time t with
a silent period of duration Tsil is authorized if and only if:
P (safety guaranteedi,t+Tsil) ≥ P (safety guaranteedi,t) (1)
The idea here is to authorize a pseudonym change and silent
period only if it will not affect the performance of the safety
application. The computation of the terms in Eq. 1 will
be detailed in the next section, after the description of the
collision avoidance system.
By comparing the impact of these three privacy strategies on
a collision avoidance application, we will be able to assess
whether the standard “pseudonym change + silent period”
strategy, here named Baseline strategy, affects the safety
performance of the ICA system. It is also expected that the
results will show whether the addition of a simple metric such
as Eq. 1 is enough to prevent a loss of safety performance
while providing some privacy protection.
In order to implement these strategies in practice, each
time we run a new simulation of one of our scenarios it is
necessary to define the time instant of the last pseudonym
change for vehicle i. In the remaining of this paper, this
time instant will be called tchg,i. For the Fixed ID strategy,
the last pseudonym change occurred at the beginning of
the current trip. This is modeled by sampling tchg,i from a
uniform distribution: tchg,i ∼ tinit − unif(0, 2 × Tavg) where
tinit is the current time at the beginning of the simulation
and Tavg = 21 minutes is the average duration of a trip [27].
For the Baseline and Adaptive strategies tchg,i is sampled
from a uniform distribution tchg,i ∼ tinit − unif(0, Tchg) where
Tchg = 120 seconds is the period of pseudonym changes.
It is assumed that the Adaptive strategy authorized the last
pseudonym change prior to the beginning of our test instances.
3) Generating multiple instances: A total of 10200 colli-
sion instances and 6300 no-collision instances were simulated,
by varying the following parameters:
• Scenario (see Section IV-A1)
• Acceleration / deceleration profiles of the EV and OV in
order to simulate different driving styles
• Privacy strategy (see Section IV-A2)
• Pseudonym change time and duration of the silent period
(generated as described in Section IV-A2).
The generated instances are 9.5 seconds long on average;
the shortest and longest ones are 8 and 10 seconds long
respectively.
The wireless communication link between the vehicles was
assumed to never suffer packet losses and to provide instanta-
neous data transmission. The impact of network disturbances
on safety applications has been investigated in the past [28],
[29] and is out of the scope of this study, since we wish to
evaluate the direct impact of the different privacy strategies on
the safety application.
B. V2X-based collision avoidance system
Several ICA systems have been proposed in the past which
rely on V2X communications, e.g. [30]–[32]. The system
used in this work is based on our previous work [32] where
we proposed to evaluate the risk of a situation by estimating
and comparing the intentions of the different drivers in the
intersection area. The advantage of this approach is that it
takes into account the dependencies between the motion of
the different vehicles, which leads to a better assessment of
the intentions of the drivers [33]. The approach was tested
both in simulation [32] and in field experiments [33]. A brief
description of the method is provided below.
1) Probabilistic motion model: The joint motion of vehicles
in a traffic scene is modeled by a Dynamic Bayesian Network
(DBN) using four categories of variables:
• Ii,t represents the maneuver being performed by vehicle
i at time t (e.g. turn left, stop). We call it I as in
“Intention”, since the maneuver performed by a vehicle
reflects the intended maneuver of the driver.
• Ei,t represents the maneuver that vehicle i is expected
to perform at time t according to the traffic laws (e.g.
turn left, stop). We call it E as in “Expectation”, since it
represents the expected maneuver.
• Φi,t represents the physical state of vehicle i at time t
(e.g. position, speed).
• Zi,t represents the measurements available about vehicle
i at time t. They often correspond to a noisy version of
a subset of the physical state variables.
Ii,t, Ei,t, and Φi,t are hidden variables, while Zi,t is ob-
served. For more clarity in the equations, in the remaining
of this paper factored stated will be used to represent the
conjunction of variables for the N vehicles in the scene, e.g.
Zt , (Z1,t...ZN,t).
The proposed joint distribution of the DBN over all the
vehicles is as follows [32]:
P (E0:tendI0:tendΦ0:tendZ0:tend) = P (E0I0Φ0Z0)
×
tend∏
t=1
×
N∏
i=1
[P (Ei,t|It−1Φt−1)× P (Ii,t|Ii,t−1Ei,t)
×P (Φi,t|Φi,t−1Ii,t)× P (Zi,t|Φi,t)] (2)
which corresponds to a classic Markov state-space model
linking Ii,t, Φi,t, and Zi,t, augmented by the expected
maneuver Ei,t which is derived from the previous situational
context (It−1Φt−1) and has an influence on the intended
maneuver Ii,t. For the interested reader more details about
this model can be found in the previously published papers
describing this DBN [32], [33].
2) Bayesian inference for risk estimation: Inference on
variables in the DBN described above is performed using a
particle filter, which means that at each timestep the probabil-
ity density function of the hidden variables It, Et, and Φt is
approximated by a set of weighted samples called particles.
The set of K particles at time t is denoted:
{Hk,t, wk,t}k=1:K (3)
with Hk,t the state of particle k at time t, and wk,t the weight
of particle k at time t.
The risk estimation algorithm proposed in [32] exploits the
fact that 90% of road accidents are caused by driver error
[26]. The probability of a collision in the future is computed
as the probability that the intentions of drivers differ from what
is expected of them:
P (∃i ∈ N : Ii,t 6= Ei,t|Z0:t) (4)
Using the particle filter, this inference can be performed by
summing up the weights of the current particles which verify
the condition (∃i ∈ N : Ii,t 6= Ei,t).
3) Autonomous emergency braking: The collision avoid-
ance application proposed in [32] triggers autonomous emer-
gency braking if and only if the probability of a collision is
higher than a threshold, i.e. iff:
P (∃i ∈ N : Ii,t 6= Ei,t|Z0:t) > γ (5)
The threshold γ was set after a precision / recall analysis
[32]. The application runs in real-time on a dedicated dual
core 2.26 GHz processor PC with 400 particles for the filter
and with new observations Zt made available very 200ms.
4) Computation of P (safety guaranteed): For the Adaptive
privacy strategy introduced in Section IV-A2, it is necessary
to compute the probability P (safety guaranteed). First of all
we define the Time-To-Collision (TTC), and the Time-To-Stop
(TTS). The TTC can be computed as the time that is left until
a collision occurs if both vehicles involved in the collision
continue on the same course and at the same speed [34]. The
TTS corresponds to the time needed by a vehicle to reach a
full stop after the ICA system intervenes, and can be computed
as follows [9]:
TTSi,t =
si,t
δ
+ Tmachine (6)
with si,t the speed of the vehicle i at time t, δ = 7m/s
2 the
deceleration applied by the ICA system, and Tmachine = 0.4 s
the average braking system response time [9].
The probability P (safety guaranteedi,t) that the collision
avoidance system is currently able to keep the vehicle i
on a collision-free trajectory can be computed by sum-
ming up the weights of the current particles which ver-
ify the condition (TTCi,t > TTSi,t). The probability
P (safety guaranteedi,t+Tsil) that the collision avoidance sys-
tem will able to keep the vehicle on a collision-free trajectory
after a silent period of duration Tsil is computed by assuming
constant speed during the silent period and summing up the
weights of the current particles which verify the condition
(TTCi,t − Tsil > TTSi,t).
V. RESULTS
A. Evaluation metrics
In order to compare the three privacy strategies described
in Section IV-A2 when applied to the scenarios defined in
Section IV-A1, we define metrics to evaluate both the level
of privacy and the safety performance of the ICA application.
The metrics are defined below.
1) Rate of missed interventions: It is computed as NM
NC
,
with NM the number of collision instances where the ICA
system never intervened before the collision occurred and NC
the number of collision instances.
2) Rate of avoided collisions: It is computed as NA
NC
, with
NA the number of collision instances where the ICA system
intervened and successfully avoided the collision and NC the
number of collision instances.
3) Rate of failed interventions: It is computed as NF
NC
,
with NF = NC − NM − NA the number of collision
instances where the ICA system intervened before the collision
occurred but was not able to avoid the collision and NC the
number of collision instances. Failed interventions, although
not desirable, are still preferable to missed interventions.
Indeed the system’s intervention, even if triggered too late
to avoid the accident, can be useful to mitigate the collision.
4) Average privacy level: It is a unitless number computed
over both collision and no-collision instances using the user-
centric location privacy model introduced by Freudiger et
al. [35]. In this model the privacy level of vehicle i is defined
based on the location privacy loss function βi(t, tchg,i, Tsil,i) :
(R+,R+,R+) → R+ where t is the current time, tchg,i ≤ t
is the time of the last pseudonym change of vehicle i, and
Tsil,i is the duration of the silent period following the last
pseudonym change. The privacy loss is set to zero after a
change of pseudonym, remains zero for the duration of the
silent period, then increases linearly with time according to a
sensitivity parameter, 0 < λ < 1 until it reaches a maximum
Amax,i(tchg,i). Thus, the privacy loss function is defined as
follows:
βi(t, tchg,i, Tsil,i) =


0 for tchg,i ≤ t < tbro,i
λ · (t− tbro,i) for tbro,i ≤ t < tmax,i
Amax,i(tchg,i) for tmax,i ≤ t
(7)
where tbro,i = tchg,i + Tsil,i is the time at which the vehicle
starts broadcasting again after a pseudonym change and a
silent period, and tmax,i =
Amax,i(tchg,i)
λ
+ tbro,i is the time when
the function reaches the maximal privacy loss. Fig. 2 illustrates
the evolution of the function βi with time.
Using βi, the privacy level Ai(t) for vehicle i at time t is then
computed as:
Ai(t) = Amax,i(tchg,i)− βi(t, tchg,i, Tsil,i), t ≥ tchg,i (8)
In practice it is generally assumed that Amax,i(tchg,i) =
log2(N), with N the number of vehicles. Therefore in our
case since N = 2 the privacy level computation simplifies to:
Ai(t) = 1− βi(t, tchg,i, Tsil,i), t > tchg,i (9)
Fig. 2. Location privacy loss function βi as a function of time. Vehicle i
changes pseudonym at times tchg,i = t1, t2, t3. Each pseudonym change is
followed by a silent period of random duration where the privacy loss remains
zero. At the end of the silent period the privacy loss increases linearly until
it reaches a maximum Amax,i(tchg,i).
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE PRIVACY STRATEGIES DEFINED IN SECTION IV-A2
OVER ALL INSTANCES DESCRIBED IN SECTION IV-A3.
Fixed ID Baseline Adaptive
Missed interventions 0.0% 30.5% 0.0%
Avoided collisions 83.0% 56.3% 83.0%
Failed interventions 17.0% 13.2% 17.0%
Average privacy level 0.37 0.98 0.94
λ models the tracking power of the adversary, therefore a
higher value of λ corresponds to a faster decrease of privacy
loss. As advised in [36], we use λ = 0.0005, which means that
the location privacy level is equal to zero after approximately
30 minutes without a pseudonym change. In other words, it
assumes that after 30 minutes an attacker can track a vehicle
and identify the driver.
B. Comparative evaluation of privacy strategies
The rate of missed interventions, avoided collisions, failed
interventions, and average privacy level are shown in Table I
for the three tested privacy strategies.
The Fixed ID strategy never misses an intervention and
is able to avoid 83% of the crashes. In 17% of the colli-
sion instances the ICA system intervened but triggering the
emergency braking was not enough to avoid the collision.
Typically, this happens when the OV slows down as if to stop
when approaching the intersection and then accelerates at the
last moment instead of stopping. The average privacy level
obtained with no pseudonym changes is 0.37. Using Eq. 9,
we find that this average privacy level is equivalent to the
privacy level obtained after a 21 minutes long trip when the
pseudonym stays fixed for the entire duration of the trip.
When applied on the same scenario instances, the Baseline
strategy reaches an average privacy level of 0.98. Using Eq. 9,
we find that this average privacy level is equivalent to the
privacy level obtained after a 40 seconds long trip when the
pseudonym stays fixed for the entire duration of the trip. This
improvement is brought by the introduction of pseudonym
changes and silent periods, but is not without consequences
on the performance of the ICA system. Indeed, the Baseline
strategy has a high rate of missed interventions (30.5%) and
Fig. 3. Adaptive strategy: Percentage of authorized pseudonym changes for
the Other Vehicle as a function of the duration of the silent period.
a rate of avoided collisions which is 26.7% lower than the
rate obtained by the Fixed ID strategy. The rate of failed
interventions is lower for the Baseline strategy, but this is
because some of the collisions that the Fixed ID strategy failed
to avoid are now missed altogether by the Baseline strategy.
The performance differences between the two strategies can
be explained by the random occurrence of pseudonym changes
and silent periods in the Baseline strategy. If a vehicle stops
broadcasting information at a critical moment during collision
instances, the ICA system may detect the danger too late.
The Adaptive strategy handles that issue by authorizing
pseudonym changes only if they do not affect the safety
application (see Section IV-A2). The results show that adding
this simple check is sufficient to restore the performance of
the ICA system. As with the Fixed ID strategy, there are no
missed interventions and 83% of collisions are avoided. The
difference is that thanks to the pseudonym changes and silent
periods, the privacy of users is much better protected: using
Eq. 9, we find that a privacy level of 0.94 is equivalent to the
privacy level obtained after a 2 minutes long trip when the
pseudonym stays fixed for the entire duration of the trip.
C. Impact of the silent period
In this section we analyze further the results described
above and investigate the decisions made by the Adaptive
strategy to authorize or deny pseudonym changes with random
silent periods. Fig. 3 shows that the percentage of authorized
pseudonym changes drops quickly from 55% to 15% as the
silent period increases from 0.1 to 2 seconds. For longer
silent periods, 10% of pseudonym changes are authorized on
average. Intuitively these observations can be explained by
the fact that traffic at road intersections is highly dynamic:
situations can become dangerous very quickly, and long silent
periods can result in vehicles crossing intersections without
broadcasting any information. This is incompatible with the
objective of the ICA to ensure safety, and explains why the
Fig. 4. Baseline strategy: Percentage of missed interventions, avoided
collisions, and failed interventions as a function of the duration of the silent
period.
Fig. 5. Adaptive strategy: Percentage of missed interventions, avoided
collisions, and failed interventions as a function of the duration of the silent
period.
Adaptive strategy denies most pseudonym changes with silent
periods longer than 2 seconds.
In order to verify this intuition we look at the distribution of
missed interventions, avoided collisions, and failed interven-
tions for different durations of the silent period. Fig. 4 shows
that introducing silent periods of duration smaller than 2 sec-
onds leads to a slight increase of the rate of failed interventions
for the Baseline strategy: 23% failed interventions on average
against of 17% for the Fixed ID strategy. However these short
silent periods do not result in missed interventions. For silent
periods of duration comprised between 2 and 3 seconds, the
rate of failed interventions keeps on rising and some missed
interventions start occurring. For silent periods longer than 3
seconds, and as the duration increases, failed interventions are
replaced by missed interventions. These observations confirm
that silent periods longer than 2 seconds strongly affect
the tested safety application, and explain why the Adaptive
strategy rejects most of the pseudonym changes associated
with long silent periods. By doing so, missed interventions
are avoided and the rate of failed interventions is kept at the
same level as the Fixed ID strategy, i.e. 17%, as shown in
Fig. 5.
D. Discussion
The main goal of this paper was to analyze the impact of
privacy strategies on V2X safety applications, and the results
presented above highlight the necessity of a joint design. That
is, the requirements of safety applications should be taken into
account when designing privacy strategies, and pseudonym
change schemes should be accounted for when designing
safety applications which rely on V2X communications. This
collaboration is necessary in order to ensure that vehicular
communications and safety applications do not neutralize each
other, but instead, work together toward safer roads.
For example, the analysis conducted in this paper shows that
the ICA application described in [32] requires silent periods
to be shorter than two seconds in order to operate correctly in
conjunction with the SAE J2735 standard (implemented here
under the name “Baseline strategy”). The results also indicate
that the addition of simple rules which authorize or not a
pseudonym change depending on the context (implemented
here under the name “Adaptive strategy”) leads to major safety
improvements compared to the SAE J2735 standard alone.
Of course these results cannot be generalized to all V2X-
based safety applications, since communication requirements
may vary depending on the location (e.g. highway, rural road,
intersection) and the application (e.g. collision avoidance,
obstacle warning, emergency vehicle warning). We believe that
studies similar to this one should be conducted in order to
determine some “rules of thumb” around the design of V2X
safety applications and privacy strategies to ensure that they
work well together.
These studies could also explore new metrics to evaluate
the safety and privacy levels. Indeed, the privacy loss function
used in Eq. 7 only considers a linear increase. In order to
represent a more realistic privacy loss, this function could
for example consider the number of messages sent with the
same pseudonym, the number of encountered neighbors (e.g,
anonymity set size), or even the vehicle’s mobility [37].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Privacy is crucial in vehicular communications in order to
ensure acceptance by users. To this end, the use of temporary
pseudonyms has been proposed to provide a tradeoff between
data privacy and security. However, this privacy mechanism is
not without consequences for safety applications. In this paper
we investigated the impact of pseudonym change strategies on
V2X-based Intersection Collision Avoidance (ICA) systems.
We considered three privacy strategies and evaluated their
performance both in terms of privacy and in terms of impact on
the collision avoidance system. We found that the ICA system
studied in this paper can operate correctly in conjunction with
the SAE J2735 standard only if silent periods are shorter than
two seconds. We also found that an “adaptive” strategy which
takes into account the probability of a collision to decide
whether a pseudonym change should be authorized or not
provides a good compromise between ICA safety and privacy
level. Future work should include similar investigations for
other scenarios and other safety applications. It will be useful
to consider a larger road network with more vehicles and
various road topologies, so as to test more complex privacy
strategies.
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